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Our Goal
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To show how involving safety organizations 
during the design life cycle can enhance the 
ultimate success of a project or program. 
How are we going to accomplish this?
• Explain the initial EVA Challenge for the build 
up of the International Space Station (ISS)
• Describe Safety’s participation in the early 
design and testing of EVA  hardware for ISS
• Describe Safety’s role in ensuring the success 
of EVAs for the ISS program
• Results of Safety involvement
– Examples of how safety inclusion in a project team 
can contribute to the success of the program
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The EVA Challenge
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Gemini Apollo Skylab Shuttle ISS
• The massive number of EVA hours that was anticipated to fully assemble the ISS became 
known as the “wall of EVAs.”  
• The relatively large number of spacewalks associated with this “wall of EVAs” was 
considered to be quite a challenge. 
Predicted Actual
EVA SAFETY - THE EARLY DAYS 
Jose Fuentes, Stacie Greene PM Challenge February 9-10, 2011 5
EVA Testing for Space Station
• Shuttle Detailed Test Objectives (DTO’s)
– STS-49 - Assembly of Station by EVA Methods 
(ASEM)
– STS-54, 57, 51 - DTO 1210 
– STS-63 – DTO 671, EVA Development Flight Test–1 
(EDFT-1)
– STS-69 – DTO 671, 672, 833, EDFT-2
– STS-72 – DTO 671, 672, 833, EDFT-3
– STS-76 – DTO 671, EDFT-4
– STS-86 – DTO 671, EDFT-5
– STS-87 – DTO 761, EDFT-6
• These EVA’s demonstrated everything from 
proof of concept for truss build, to 
demonstration of new tools that were being 
developed for ISS.
• EVA Safety developed operational safety 
assessments, certified all EVA hardware, 
assessed hardware through all design 
phases, and provided real-time support 
during each EVA.
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EVA Safety in the Beginning of ISS 
Program
• Participated in the development of safety requirements 
for the  EMU and EVA tools for use on ISS
• Participated in early hardware concept development
• Participated in Preliminary Design Reviews (PDRs) 
through Critical Design Reviews (CDRs) to review 
hardware designs for incorporation of safety 
requirements
• Participated in NBL hardware testing, procedure 
development
• Certified all ISS EVA hardware 
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EVA SAFETY’S ROLL IN THE ISS
PROGRAM
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Safety’s Roll in ISS EVA
• EVA Safety supports ISS Program through the EVA 
Project Office by ensuring all EVA planning, hardware 
development and assembly, sustaining engineering, 
and real-time operations are accomplished safely 
with the highest rate of mission assurance. 
• EVA Safety interacts with and maintains the complete 
life cycle for EVA tools, Extravehicular Mobility Unit 
(EMU) hardware, and operational procedures.  
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PDR, CDR, PSRP, SRP, JOP, CRs
EMU/EVA Tools Panel, FESRRP, GCARs
NBL training, VR lab, flight rules, procedures, 
verification, risk identification, ORAESR
EVA:
CoFR1/2
S&MA:
CD FRR
SMSR
MER Console
Real-time 
safety
Tiger 
Teams/Team 
4
Program support
EVA hardware support
Operations support
Flight Readiness Real-time operations
SSP/ISS EVA Support Flow
• Assess hardware requirements and designs for 
EVA safety documentation compliance 
•Assess all data packages and Hazard Reports for 
sound engineering analysis and completeness
•Generate an operational risk assessment 
executive summaries for EVA procedures 
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Neutral Buoyancy 
Lab (NBL) EVA runs 
and other crew 
training events are 
assessed for safety 
of hardware 
operations
Virtual Reality (VR) LabHardware training events
RESULTS OF SAFETY INVOLVEMENT
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Involving safety early in the design 
analysis assures compliance with 
safety requirements
Examples of Safety Early Involvement
• During review of the stress analysis for the Simplified Aid 
For EVA Rescue (SAFER) tower latch, EVA Safety identified 
latch piece parts missing from the analysis.  Additionally, 
the incorrect factor of safety was used in the analysis.  
Inclusion of the parts and correct factors of safety 
resulted in the successful certification of the redesigned 
latch mechanism.
• Identified necessary updates to EMU ground turn-around 
procedures which resulted in expedited ground 
processing of the EMU for flight.
• Provided EVA Safety expertise to the International 
Partner’s through their hardware design and safety 
process.
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The involvement of safety 
provides for successful anomaly 
resolution. This can also lead to 
success with any future use of the 
hardware.
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Latch Failure
• Anomaly: SAFER latch 
inadvertently released on 
STS-121. 
• Action: Developed a 
temporary solution to 
prevent the inadvertent 
release in the near term.  
Then collaborated with 
engineering to develop a 
permanent solution.  
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EMU Sensor Failure
• Anomaly: EMU Carbon Dioxide Sensor failed during 
EVA preparation
• Action: As a member of the Tiger Team, EVA safety 
participated in the  investigation and real-time  
decision meetings to reach an agreement on 
continuation of the EVA.  Flight Rules were reviewed 
and approved  by EVA Safety, engineering groups and 
medical  branch to cover all situations with failure of 
CO2 sensor.                          
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Potential ISS Contamination
• Issue: Potential ISS atmosphere 
contamination from byproducts 
produced by regeneration of the Metal 
Oxide (METOX) containers within the 
ISS
• Action: During the review of the test 
plan and final reports, EVA Safety 
requested that additional chemical 
compounds be added to the list of 
those being analyzed. After these 
additions, the test plan and final report 
were approved, allowing continued use 
of METOX regeneration on ISS.
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An R&R Assessment
• Hazard: The Remove & Replace (R&R) 
of the failed Bearing Motor Roll Ring 
Module (BMRRM) on ISS US EVA-14, 
required a powered connector 
demate in order to keep power to ISS 
during the change out.
• Action:  EVA safety assisted with the 
development of an electrical inhibit 
protocol that would allow the canister 
to be safely removed and not cause 
interruption of power to the ISS.
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A fully integrated safety team is 
better equipped to support the 
project during real-time 
operations
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Stuck Solar Arrays
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Anomaly:  During STS-97, the solar 
arrays (SA’s) became stuck on 
deployment.  Prior to this mission there 
was no plan for EVA to interface with this 
hardware, and it was identified as a keep 
out zone.
Action: As a member of the Tiger 
Team, EVA Safety worked with the 
hardware developers, operations 
engineers and astronauts to develop a 
plan for safely avoiding the sharp 
edges and other hazards on the 
blanket box.  This allowed for a 
successful SA deployment and 
established a plan for use on future SA 
deployments.
Solar Array Repair
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Anomaly: During deployment of the 
solar array on STS-120, the solar array 
snagged on itself and tore part of the 
array. 
Action: EVA Safety played 
a direct role in identifying 
tools and influencing 
procedures to keep EVA 
crewmembers safe and 
avoid further damage to 
ISS. Safety controls were 
defined and implemented 
that protected the crew 
from possible electrical 
shock and minimized risk 
to sharp edges from the 
damaged array. 
Missed Inhibit
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Hazard: During STS-124, prior to EVA 2 the required electrical inhibits had not 
been implemented as required for the EVA installation of cameras.
Action: EVA Safety 
personnel, on console in 
the Mission Evaluation 
Room (MER), brought 
this issue to the attention 
of the MER manager.  It 
was then elevated to the 
flight director who 
assured that the inhibits 
were put in place to 
mitigate the shock hazard 
to the crew.  
Safety involvement provides the 
opportunity for special 
assessments and innovations for 
understanding and addressing risk
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EMU Contamination Assessment
Anomaly: The on-orbit EMU cooling system became 
contaminated requiring the EMU fleet to be taken 
out of service for approximately a year.
Action: EVA Safety actively participated in the Tiger 
Team investigation to determine the contamination 
source and  corrective actions.  EVA Safety then 
provided FMEA/CIL and Hazard Report controls that 
were used in the final approval of EMU’s for return to 
service. 
Jose Fuentes, Stacie Greene PM Challenge February 9-10, 2011 25
EMU Cut Glove Assessment
Anomaly: EMU gloves 
experienced cuts and 
abrasions during EVAs
Action: EVA Safety assisted in 
the development of go/no 
go criteria and its 
application in real-time 
assessments of EVA glove 
damage, resulting in EVA 
abort/continuation 
decisions. 
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Innovations
• Instituted a Sharp edge inspection program
– Traveled to hardware provider sites to provide training.
– Effected change out of nuts on PM and Node hardware 
during inspection
• Coordinated the development of a EMU glove Touch 
temperature memo
– Provided the ISS hardware developers with more details on 
the EMU glove thermal capabilities than was published in 
their requirements.  It allowed for a more flexibility in the 
design of the operational procedures 
• Operational Risk Assessment Executive Summary Report 
(ORAESR) development
– This report was instituted to document all operational 
hazards and their controls associated with each Shuttle 
mission. 
• Was reformatted for ISS to document hazards 
associated with each element.
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The Future
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• Participation has begun in the Constellation 
program
– Writing/assessing safety requirements
– Participated in design selection assessments
• Affected design of the Lunar Rover
• Suit to Orion umbilical and connector design 
– Authored preliminary Hazard Reports for the 
initial Cx suit design
– Authored EVA SR&QA Plan
In Summary
• The success of the EVA team, that includes the 
EVA project office, Crew Office, Mission 
Operations, Engineering and Safety, is assured by 
the full integration of all necessary disciplines.  
• Safety participation in all activities from hardware 
development concepts, certification and crew 
training, provides for a strong partnership within 
the team. 
• Early involvement of Safety on the EVA team has 
mitigated risk and produced a high degree of 
mission success.
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